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ABSTRACT 
 
Didem Türkoğlu: Discussing Politics on Facebook: Club Model and Rowdy Deliberative Talk 
(Under the direction of Charles Kurzman) 
 
Scholars who study deliberative democracy put a lot of emphasis on the importance of 
the way people talk about politics, which shapes their thoughts and practices. In online political 
settings people tend to talk about politics with like-minded individuals creating echo chambers. 
However, by focusing on overtly political venues, the literature understudies the political talk 
that takes place in non-political settings. In this paper I investigate the question of how we come 
across political discourse on a pre-dominantly non-political platform on social network sites 
(SNSs). Based on a mix-method analysis of over 80.000 comments from the 50 most popular 
public Facebook pages from Turkey, the findings suggest that we are more likely to find 
deliberative talk in non-political settings if politics is considered to be an appropriate discussion 
topic. They may also be unexpectedly rowdy, contrary to the most of the conceptualizations of 
deliberative talk.1 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
On 6 September 2012, the Facebook page of the Galatasaray Sport Club (one of the most 
popular sport clubs in Turkey) hosted a heated discussion about which word should be used in 
reference to God: Tanrı or Allah. The reason for the discussion was a post made by the page’s 
administrator expressing condolences to the families of the soldiers who died as a result of an 
explosion in a military armory. The admin used the word Tanrı2 instead of Allah. Tanrı is 
Turkish. Allah is Arabic but also widely used in Turkish. This created a huge uproar. Some of the 
page members deemed Tanrı to be related to Christianity or polytheism, thus not Islamic enough, 
while others supported the usage by finding it more “modern,” more “secular” or more 
“Turkish.” However, this wasn’t only a semantics debate because it took place against a 
background of emotional outrage in the mass media due to the increasing numbers of terrorist 
attacks, instability along the Syrian border, and a public discussion among politicians and the 
mass media about whether the state is losing its secular premise. Consequently, the sides taken 
by Facebook users also reflected their position on these issues as well as a criticism of the 
government and the party in power. The tone of the Facebook conversations was quite 
antagonistic and in some instances expressed outrage, but there were also attempts by some users 
to provide information and convince people of opposing views. In some instances there were 
small indications of solidarity next to swearing or threats of unsubscribing from the page if the 
initial controversial post wasn’t edited. 
This example is just one among many that might give us clues about how we come across 
 
political discourse on social network sites (SNSs) in a pre-dominantly non-political platform. 
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The literature has a tendency to talk about deliberation as an outcome, focuses on exclusively 
political venues and relies heavily on research settings like forums and focus groups. In doing so 
it understudies the political talk that takes place in non-political settings. There is also a tendency 
to disregard the type of political talk that reflects some characteristics of deliberation and yet 
does not reach a well-defined outcome. In this paper, deliberative talk is operationalized in terms 
of the presence of inter-ideological questioning. It also includes tolerance for the presentation of 
ideas/ positions that are not shared by the main political position of the page (for overtly political 
pages) or a position different than one’s own (for the users in seemingly non-political page 
settings). Tolerance might be demonstrated through an explicit encouragement or it might be 
demonstrated by the absence of discouragement. In doing so, this paper contributes to the 
literature in the following ways. 
Firstly, this paper aims to look at the way politics is discussed in a not exclusively 
political platform. Political talk does not exclusively take place in overtly political settings. 
Secondly, the type of deliberative talk can also be quite rowdy unlike the normative prescriptions 
proposed by some scholars. When the primary affiliation of the group is not political then 
presentation of different political ideas, especially those that are not shared by the members at 
large, might not be perceived as a threat to the basis of the group and might be tolerated. 
Based on the analysis, I suggest a club model to describe the interactions on popular 
public Facebook pages. Facebook data provides an opportunity to capture the interaction of the 
speech acts and the social context as it occurs. Influential users shape the conversations and who 
will be informally included is shaped by those conversations, which vary among Facebook 
pages. Furthermore, in relation to SNSs and from the perspective of civic engagement and 
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deliberation, this paper cautions against making generalizations about a certain site by 
demonstrating different dynamics of political talk within the same SNS. 
In what follows, I elaborate on how deliberative talk is approached in previous works. I 
discuss how we can conceptualize deliberative talk and suggest two hypotheses. We are more 
likely to find deliberative talk in non-political pages and in some instances uncivil and outraged 
comments might encourage deliberative talk. In the quantitative analysis section I demonstrate 
that we are more likely to find deliberative talk in sports pages, even if deliberative talk in 
general is rare. In the qualitative conversation analysis section I discuss how political talk takes 
place by putting an emphasis on the mechanisms. 
My findings suggest that in the overtly political Facebook pages, discussion is deemed 
acceptable only if the user believes in the same things the group stands for, so there isn’t much 
room for inter-ideological talk. On the seemingly non-political Facebook pages there are mixed 
responses. While on entertainment pages it is considered not very appropriate to discuss politics, 
on the pages of soccer clubs/fans there is an interesting pattern of deliberative talk. We are more 
likely to find rowdy deliberative talk on sports pages. 
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CHAPTER 2: DELIBERATIVE POLITICAL TALK 
 
Civic engagement and deliberation are two of the major issues scholars discuss in 
democratic theory. Debates on deliberative democracy gained momentum in the late 1990s with 
the discussions of John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas. (Dryzek 2000; Habermas 1996; Rawls 
1993) Problems of democracy and the limitations of the current political structures led to a 
concern with the future of democracy and civic engagement. Within this context the rise of the 
Internet as a new and popular medium attracted attention, and scholars began to inquire whether 
this new medium can open some new opportunities for deliberation and civic engagement. 
In this paper, I take Facebook as a reflection of political conversations that occur in 
everyday life settings even if there are peculiarities due to being an online medium. Facebook 
gives us an opportunity to observe political conversations as they happen without the 
interference of the researchers. Moreover, it allows us to capture the interactions between the 
users as a group as well as the interactions of the users with the particular context they are in. 
Consequently, bringing the discussions on SNSs and political conversations together give us an 
advantage to more closely scrutinize these dynamics. 
Putnam was concerned about “cyberbalkanization” leading to atomization and 
segregation of communities (Putnam 2000). Even if there are studies showing that 
cyberbalkanization does not seem to be supported on the social capital level (Skoric, Ying, and 
Ng 2009; Vergeer and Pelzer 2009), implications still exist for political communities on the 
Internet. The structure of the discussion forums might influence whether the online environment 
is deliberative or not(Stroud 2008; Wright and Street 2007). The cyberbalkanization argument is 
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revised further by the argument that Internet forums are not the place for democratic debate but 
they are merely “echo chambers”(Jamieson and Cappella 2008). Some scholars regard this as 
having caused an erosion of the common ground which is especially important for the 
democratic theory and discussions on deliberation (Sunstein 2007). 
If the cyberbalkanization argument is valid, then we would expect to see very little 
deliberation on the Internet especially in regard to inter-ideological conversations. For the 
political communities, this seems especially hard to achieve due to the prevalence of echo 
chambers. Consequently on Facebook, I would expect to find political pages reflecting echo 
chambers as well, where the people who interact with each other are the ones who share the same 
political position. 
One of the approaches to the issue of civic engagement and the SNS is the argument that 
social networking sites enable more interaction, increase social capital, and facilitate offline 
social relations (Boyd 2006; Ellison, Steinfield, and Lampe 2007). In parallel to this argument, 
scholars also argue that SNSs facilitate and/or encourage civic and political engagement (Gaby 
and Caren 2012; Marzouki, Skandrani-Marzouki, jaoui, Hammoudi, and Bellaj 2012; Pasek, 
More, and Romer 2009; Valenzuela, Arriagada, and Scherman 2012; Zúñiga, Jung, and 
Valenzuela 2012). 
Even if Facebook has been presented as a quite democratic tool where people create and 
share their own ideas without any mediation that can be imposed upon them, still the conventions 
and norms of conversations are learned in other settings. Those conventions and norms influence 
the structure of the political narrative on Facebook as well as the deliberate discursive choices of 
the people and discursive frames available to them(Polletta, Chen, Gardner, and Motes 2011). 
First, the conversations are not on equal footing in having equal chance of gaining popularity. 
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Second, these conversations are also composed of deliberative, contentious as well as polarizing 
talk. New social media cannot provide a uniform effect on political action but at the same time 
they do provide a new setting as well as norms and rituals for political conversation. 
Deliberation is a difficult aim to achieve which takes place only occasionally. (Button 
and Mattson 1999; Hendriks 2006; Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005)Deliberative political 
conversation is defined as composed of “openness to political conflict, the absence of 
conversational dominance, clear and reasonable argument, and mutual comprehension.”(Moy 
and Gastil 2006) Also see. (Carpini, Cook, and Jacobs 2004)Moy and Gastil support the 
argument that one needs to make a distinction between social conversation and problem solving 
conversation. In the former people are among like-minded individuals and their conversation 
does not have a clear goal. In the latter case, on the other hand, the conversation is public, leads 
to sound judgment, involves people with different ideas and beliefs, and finally has an egalitarian 
atmosphere that is non-tyrannical but politically equal(Conover, Searing, and Crewe 2002). Such 
a distinction is hard to make. Moreover, as Andrew Perrin suggests we cannot confine political 
talk to these types of situations because political talk takes place in formal as well as informal 
settings.(Perrin 2006) Furthermore, political conversations are rarely as problem-oriented as the 
supporters of rationality in deliberative conversation literature suggest. 
Some scholars suggest that people might think that argumentative discussions are 
reserved for the private space (Conover, Searing, and Crewe 2002). This approach would predict 
that the people might avoid argumentative discussions in public forums. However, there are also 
studies which disagree with the avoidance argument (Stromer-Galley and Muhlberger 2009). 
Others argue that political conflict or political homogeneity do not influence online political 
deliberation (Albrecht 2006). I suggest that we can look at the instances of conflictual political 
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talk and even discourses of outrage and see if we can find any instances where there are also 
elements of deliberative political talk. However in order to do that, the operationalization of 
deliberative talk needs to be more flexible. In that regard, civil-rational-solution oriented talk 
would be only one of the possible types of deliberative talk, not the only type of deliberative talk. 
We also need to consider the contexts these comments are made such as how individual 
comments are positioned in the conversation and how they can be tied to the norms of 
conversation prevalent in those specific group-conversational contexts(Polletta and Lee 2006). 
In a study on political micro cultures and logics used in political talk Andrew Perrin, for 
example, finds out that sports groups use “doubt” logics more and argues that this might be 
related to their “relative insulation from public sphere problems” compared to unions, business 
associations and churches (Perrin 2005). Likewise it would not be very fruitful to just look at the 
conversation made in the same general theme across all groups because the way those 
conversations are made would also reflect the different characteristics of the groups as well as 
the differences of group members in those settings. 
As I will demonstrate in the case of Facebook sports pages, people might be aware of 
different political positions among the audience they target and yet depending on the norms and 
group identity of the page they might still engage in political discussions. Based on the 
arguments presented in the literature review, I expect to see some political talk on these 
Facebook pages especially the overtly political ones which will be discussed further below. 
However, the literature suggests that we would expect to see echo chambers formed along 
ideological lines and deliberation would be very rare on these overtly political pages. I expect to 
see a higher percentage of deliberative talk on non-political pages when political issues come up 
since they are not based on the echo chambers of political camps. (Hypothesis 1) 
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In this regard, I would like to see to what degree presentation of different ideas are 
encouraged (explicitly) or tolerated (absence of discouragement). On Facebook, one might find 
formal discouragement in the form of deleting one’s comment or banning someone altogether. 
There are also less formal tactics that might be employed such as using the discourse of outrage 
to demonize and discredit opposing opinions, constructing a political identity that would 
emphasize us/them or overwhelming use of emotional support that indirectly discourages diverse 
opposing opinions by creating the norms of behavior in a certain page. Consequently, my coding 
will be informed by these concerns as I will discuss below in the methodology section. 
Following Dahlberg’s three model typology of democratic communication Freelon 
proposes to evaluate political talk on the Internet on the following models: liberal individualist, 
communitarian and deliberative. (Freelon 2010) According to him; in the deliberative model, 
according to Freelon, indicative metric is composed of rational-critical argument, public issues 
focus, equality between participants, focus on the discussion topic, inter-ideological questioning 
and inter-ideological reciprocity. This category is heavily influenced by a Habermasian 
understanding of deliberation. Similarly, in their book Outrage Industry Jeffrey Berry and Sarah 
Sobieraj emphasize the negative consequences of the outraged discourses forming a barrier 
against potential deliberation.(Berry and Sobieraj 2013) In both of Freelon’s and Berry and 
Sobieraj’s arguments, most political talk on Facebook wouldn’t be considered fitting to this 
deliberative model because of a lack of rational-critical argument and the exclusive focus on the 
discussion topic. 
However, in those pages, we also occasionally see encouragement of the presentation of 
dissenting views and reciprocity even if the discussion is not always civil. Considering the 
argument I made earlier about a flexible operationalization of deliberative talk, I expect to find 
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some rowdy political talk in the Facebook conversations I analyze. There might be instances of 
incivility and outrage and yet the same uncivil and outraged comments might also encourage 
different political views in the conversation in the forms of deliberative political talk (Hypothesis 
2). 
Facebook Pages 
 
Currently, Turkey ranks as the sixth country in terms of the number of Facebook users in 
the world. In 2012 Turkish Facebook users represent 90 % of the population who uses the 
Internet in Turkey.3 2013 PEW Global Attitudes survey reports that 79% of Internet users are 
also active in Social Networking Sites.4 In Turkey, roughly 42% of the population uses the 
Internet (TÜİK 2010). Based on the statistics provided by TÜİK (Türkiye İstatistik 
Kurumu/Turkish Statistical Institute) an average Internet user in Turkey is more likely to be 
young (between 16 and 34), educated (high school graduate and above) and living in the urban 
areas of the country. Therefore the study of Facebook will also be reflecting these demographic 
characteristics. It is interesting that Turkey is ranking among the top countries whose Facebook 
users share political views or religious views. Based on PEW Global attitudes survey for 42%5 of 
the SNS users in Turkey, the share their views on religion and politics on these sites. 
It is useful to briefly look at the top 50 most popular public Facebook pages to see some of 
the trends on Facebook. When most popular 50 public Facebook pages (see Table 1)6 followed 
by the users from Turkey are scrutinized a distinction can be seen between the overtly political 
pages and the rest of the pages. Here I use a relatively narrow definition of “political” that covers 
statesmen, state institutions or concepts/institutions heavily regulated by the state. Among these 
50 Facebook pages, the category of overtly political refers to the pages that focus on religion, 
military or political persona/parties. The seemingly non-political ones include entertainment, 
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music and sports. The pages that can be considered overtly political are Atatürk, Hz. 
Muhammed, Mehmetçik, Namaz, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and Türk Silahlı 
Kuvvetleri.7 
a) Overtly Political Pages 
 
Overtly political groups analyzed in this paper refer to Mehmetçik (support page for 
soldiers/ army), Namaz (praying), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (prime minister), and Kemal 
Kılıçdaroğlu (main opposition party leader). As I will discuss further below, in those pages the 
political discussions are acceptable only if the person in question believes in the same things the 
group stands for. In Mehmetçik, anti-militarist comments or comments that criticize Turkish 
nationalism would not be welcomed; in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s pages 
criticism of the party lines would be considered treacherous. These pages reflect the political 
polarization in Turkey quite well. 
b) Entertainment 
 
Entertainment category, broadly construed, is the most common category in the top 50 
which is not necessarily surprising considering the fact that Facebook is used mainly for 
communication and entertainment purposes. On the days I collected data, 21 pages in this 
category had some political discussion but overall there were very few instances and were mostly 
restricted to a few comments rather than full-fledged conversations (see Table 2 for the 
frequency of political comments). As I will discuss later this had a lot to do with the perceptions 
of users. In many cases, those pages are deemed inappropriate for political discussion. 
c) Sports 
 
Most popular top 3 Facebook pages are the pages of the most popular sports clubs in 
Turkey: Galatasaray, Fenerbahce and Besiktas.8 However, “the big three” in Turkey are not 
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known for their political positions like St Pauli of Hamburg known for its slogan “no more war, 
no more fascism.” Turkish teams’ rivalry is not akin to the one that used to be between FC 
Barcelona and Real Madrid under Franco in Spain when Real Madrid represented the 
authoritarian center and Barcelona represented socialist Catalonia.(Kuhn 2011) 
There are different and multiple fan groups affiliated with big teams like Galatasaray, 
Fenerbahce and Besiktas. Overall political profile of the supporters of these teams is quite 
diverse for these most popular and most commercialized teams. During the Gezi protests some of 
the fan clubs of these three major teams became quite visible. Some of the supporters 
participated the protests with their team jerseys, which emphasized their fan identity as well as 
that identity’s presence in those events. However, this does not mean that supporters of these 
teams as a whole are situated at one side of the political spectrum. 
Debates over the protests in the stadiums are cases in point to underline this political 
diversity. Some of the soccer fans continued their protest in the soccer games of these three clubs 
by chanting “Everywhere is Taksim, everywhere is resistance” at the 34th minute of the games 
during the international matches as well as the first part of the national league in fall 2013. Çarşı 
fan group was the main organizer of protests among Besiktas fans9 which led to the 
establishment of a pro-government Besiktas fan group, 1453 Eagles, and clashes during the 
games. GençFenerbahçeliler, the fan group that supported and participated Gezi protests, also 
had some backlash during their protests in the stadiums. Similarly, in Galatasaray matches the 
West and Southeast tribunes chanted pro-Gezi slogans which caused a reaction from another fan 
group Ultraslan. These tensions indicate the political diversity of the fans of these sports clubs. 
UltrAslan10 is a fan group of Galatasaray established in 2001 in order to unify different 
 
small fan groups of Galatasaray. In line with the general trend of ultra movement, they also 
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declare that they are against further commercialization of soccer. Unlike the previous sport pages 
I discussed, this is the only fan group page that made it to the most popular top 50. There were 
also soccer fans who joined Gezi protests under the Ultraslan flag with Galatasaray jerseys but 
Ultraslan itself made a public declaration that they remain unaffiliated to any political position 
while respecting the diversity of political positions among its members. In some cases they were 
actively against the pro-Gezi protests in the stadiums. Considering these points, I also expect the 
members of the Facebook page reflect different political positions and ideologies. 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
I collected Facebook comments between September-December 2012 by selecting five 
random days. (6 September, 17 October, 1 November, 20 November and 26 December) I located 
the posts made on these dates and downloaded all the comments made on these posts allowing 
for a week lag so that I did not cut an ongoing conversation. I downloaded 430 posts in total. 
The number of posts per page in a given day may vary between 0-21. There are 44 active pages 
in the top 50 list as indicated in Table 1. Among these 44 pages, 29 of them posted at least once 
in one of the five days selected. Most of the comments are made within the first two days but in 
some occasions the conversations continued for a couple more days. These dates did not coincide 
with a national holiday or a major prescheduled political event. However, this does not mean that 
there weren’t any major political events that might trigger political conversation. 
On September the 6th, for example, a military armory exploded killing soldiers. On 
November 1, a hot debate on the news was the hunger strike of some of the Kurdish prisoners. 
These instances and their influence on Facebook discussions also reflect fast-moving political 
agenda on the news in Turkey, and helps us capture the “ordinary”(Yumul and Özkirimli 2000). 
In this sense it is more useful to use random date selection strategy rather than trying to focus on 
either politically loaded days or trying to avoid all major political events. 
The selection of the Facebook pages for data collection is based on the ranking provided 
by socialbakers (see appendix for further information and the full list). I focused on the top 50 
most popular Facebook pages from Turkey based on their ranking in 29 August 2012. Based on 
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the content of the Facebook page (main motivation to like that particular page) I divided these 
pages into the categories of Entertainment, Sports, Overtly political pages. 
The way comments are made on Facebook form nested data. Each comment is nested in a 
conversation and each conversation is nested in a post. Each post is nested in a public Facebook 
page and those pages are also nested in the categories I formed: entertainment, sports, overtly 
political. For coding this data, I took comments as the unit of analysis. I coded over 80.000 
comments. The comments are coded if they are political. If they did not have a political content 
no further coding is done. Every comment is coded for each variable which means that one 
comment can be coded as civil, outraged, encouraging dissent and responding to someone all at 
the same time. 
Reliability and replicability can be a serious concern in content analyses. Replicability 
means that different analysts can reproduce the same coding. A political science PhD student 
whose native language is Turkish helped me out to test this criterion. She coded a sample of 100 
political comments and coded for all the variables. We reached 93% reliability score. 
This paper employs a mixed methods approach. In order to demonstrate the relationships 
and general trends among and within the Facebook groups I make comment-level analysis and 
present post level percentages of variables. I also used logistic regression to tease out the effects 
of variables on deliberative talk. In the quantitative section, the unit of analysis is the comment in 
order to show the relationship among the characteristics of a comment and how these 
characteristics differ among page types. In the qualitative section, on the other hand I would like 
to demonstrate the dynamics of conversations in order to highlight how we come across 
deliberative talk. This enables me to capture the way conversations are made and deliberative 
talk is produced, beyond the comment characteristics. 
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Outcome Variable: Deliberative Talk 
 
This variable is a combination of two variables; deliberation status and response. The 
discussions I presented in the literature review emphasize reciprocity and engagement with 
different ideas as the most important features of deliberation. Deliberation status focuses on 
whether political talk is encouraged, whether inclusive wording such as “my friend, my 
sister/brother” is used, and whether a political point of view that is not supported by the page in 
general or the user in particular is encouraged to be presented. This measure focuses on 
presentation of a dissenting view, not necessarily ideological differences. 
Response variable on the other hand indicates whether that specific comment is made 
explicitly in response to a comment made earlier by another user. In doing so I measure if the 
comment is engaging with another position in a meaningful manner. The absence of explicit 
discouragement will be the key in my analysis of deliberative talk. 
As a result, deliberative talk is a dummy variable that measures deliberative talk as a 
comment made in response to someone and whether it is not explicitly discouraging the 
presentation of different ideas. 
a) Deliberation Status 
 
This variable measures the degree of encouragement of deliberative talk in a given 
political comment. The comments can be discouraging deliberative talk (coded as 1), neutral 
(coded as 2) or encouraging deliberative talk (coded as 3.) I consider a comment encouraging if 
the words like brother, sister, friend, fellow user/fan is used to facilitate conversation. It would 
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also be encouraging if people are supported to discuss further or if an opposing ideological 
position is engaged with in an encouraging manner in response a comment made earlier. On the 
other hand, I consider negative content that alienates users from discussion, threats to ban 
someone or threats to leave the Facebook page as discouraging. This is important to distinguish 
deliberation and “echo chambers” as discussed in the literature. 
b) Response 
 
This is a dummy variable that indicates whether the comment is written specially in 
response to someone usually the user who wrote a comment previously in the same post. 
Reciprocity is defined as one of the key elements of deliberation as discussed my many scholars 
including Freelon (2010). 
Co-Variates 
 
a) Civility 
 
It takes the form of insulting or verbal fighting which affects the way the norms and the 
tone of conversation is established in conversations. It is coded as a dichotomous variable: 0 
indicates incivility, 1 indicates civil talk. Most of the scholars studying deliberation and political 
talk consider civility a necessary condition but depending on the context uncivil language might 
also be used to encourage deliberative talk. 
b) Us/Them Distinctions 
 
In-group solidarity is an important element in trying to understand the nature of 
conversations on Facebook pages. Political homogeneity in groups are considered to be a 
disadvantage for deliberation and yet the perception of sharing a common ground might be a 
motivation for encouraging deliberative talk. 
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There are two types of us /them distinctions. These distinctions might refer to an out- 
group (that is a group which is not part of the specific Facebook group in question.) It could also 
refer to an in-group pointing out the differences among the members of the Facebook group. The 
former is coded as 2 and the latter is coded as 1. The absence of any us/them distinction is coded 
as 0. 
c) Outrage 
 
Outrage is tied to the negative emotional responses that work against the ideal conditions 
of deliberative talk, which is usually attributed to a rational (i.e. not emotional) position as I 
discussed in the literature review. Outrage is defined as a “form of political discourse involving 
efforts to provoke visceral responses (e.g. anger, righteousness, fear, moral indignation) from the 
audience through the use of overgeneralizations, sensationalism, misleading or patently 
inaccurate information, ad hominem attacks and partial truths about opponents, who may be 
individuals, organizations or entire communities of interest (e.g. progressives or conservatives) 
or circumstance (e.g. immigrants).” (Sobieraj and Berry. 2011) In this study presence of outrage 
is coded as 1 and its absence is coded as 0. 
d) Strong Emotional Support 
 
It is a dummy variable that indicates whether the comment contains a strong emotional support 
to the main line of the argument made in the initial post or strong emotional support to the 
political position taken by the group. The threshold for this variable is quite high but the 
presence of users who show absolute emotional devotion to a certain position would discourage 
critical talk. (i.e. “You are the sun to me!”) 
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e) Criticism of the Facebook Page Administrator 
 
This is a dummy variable coded for whether there is a direct criticism to the admin of the 
Facebook group for a certain post. 
f) Rowdiness 
 
This is a dummy variable that combines two variables I mentioned above: civility and outrage. 
The position I criticized in the literature review suggests that deliberative talk should not have 
the characteristics of outrage or incivility. Consequently, this variable combines the cases where 
there is incivility or outrage in a given comment. (no collinearity between variables) Since 
civility and absence of outrage are considered to be the tenants of rational-critical deemed 
necessary for the Habermasian understanding of deliberation, it is important to scrutinize how 
deliberative talk fare in relation to rowdiness. 
Descriptive Analyses 
 
Among the comments coded in this study roughly 10% is political. (see table 4) In the 
case of these political comments 84% were civil. Furthermore, 4% of the political comments is a 
comment of outrage, 2% contained strong emotional support for the Facebook group. 3% of the 
comments were explicitly encouraging and 6% were directly discouraging deliberative talk. 
Discouraging comments are twice the number of encouraging comments so in general one would 
come across discouragement of deliberative talk more frequently. 
The table below shows the distribution of the characteristics of political comments 
among the Facebook page types. More than half the comments analyzed here are made on the 
entertainment pages yet those pages did not host many political comments. Sports pages on the 
other hand rank the second both in terms of the volume of comments in general and the 
proportion of political comments (6%.) Not surprisingly there are more political comments on 
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overtly political pages (57%) but not all comments made on the overtly political pages are 
political. 
Table 4. Facebook Page Type Characteristics in Comment Numbers 
 Entertainment Sports Political Total 
Political     
no 40.026 (98%) 25.765(93%) 4525 (43%) 70316 (89%) 
yes 924(2%) 1793(7%) 6111(57%) 8828(11%) 
Deliberation status 
discouraging 99(11%) 143(8%) 288(5%) 530(6%) 
neutral 793(86%) 1517(85%) 5699(93%) 8009(91%) 
encouraging 30(3%) 131(7%) 128(2%) 289(3%) 
Outrage     
no 583(63%) 1022(57%) 3864(63%) 5469(62%) 
yes 341(37%) 771(43%) 2247(37%) 3359(38%) 
Civil     
no 120(13%) 141(8%) 1143(19%) 1404(16%) 
yes 802(87%) 1652(92%) 4971(81%) 7425(84%) 
Us/them     
none 777(84%) 1509(84%) 4773(78%) 7059(80%) 
ingroup 45(5%) 134(7%) 1099(18%) 1278(14%) 
outgroup 100(11%) 153(9%) 238(4%) 491(6%) 
Strong emotional support 
no 888(96%) 1782 (99%) 4470(73%) 7140 (81%) 
yes 36(4%) 13 (1%) 1639(27%) 1688 (19%) 
Response to Someone     
no 722(78%) 1299(72%) 5278(86%) 7299(83%) 
yes 202(22%) 495(28%) 833(14%) 1530 (17%) 
Criticism of Page 
Admin 
    
no 871(94%) 1494(83%) 5975(98%) 8340(94%) 
yes 53(6) 299(17%) 136 (2%) 488(6%) 
 
Deliberative Talk 
    
No 774(84%) 1410(79%) 5492(90%) 7675(87%) 
Yes 150(16%) 383(21%) 620(10%) 1153(13%) 
Rowdy     
No 560(61%) 1010(56%) 3668(60%) 5238(59%) 
Yes 364 (39%) 783(44%) 2447(40%) 3594(41%) 
 
 
Highest percentage of deliberative talk is in sports pages with 21%. Entertainment pages 
follow sports pages (16%) and deliberative talk goes down to 10% on overtly political pages. 
Reciprocity is also one of the key characteristics of deliberative talk. The table also suggest that 
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responsiveness is highest in sports pages (28%) while overtly political pages have the lowest 
percentage of responsiveness, half of what we see on sports pages (14%). Entertainment pages 
on the other hand are positioned somewhere in between with 22%. 
Rowdiness on the other hand is quite a common feature among the Facebook types but 
sports pages still lead the page types with 44%. Strong emotional support for the page in the 
political comments is almost an exclusive characteristic of the overtly political pages. This might 
indirectly work against deliberation which I will discuss in the qualitative section. 
Posts 
 
Since the comments I analyze are also nested in the posts it is useful to look at how these 
characteristics are distributed as percentages at the post level. Table below demonstrates this 
distribution by including the posts with more than 25 political comments as an indication of a 
meaningful length of a conversation. With this threshold I have 58 posts (10 entertainment, 8 
sports, and 40 political). This table confirms the same overall trend observed in the comment 
analyses. 
Table 5. Posts with Significant Number of Political Comments with 
25 Political Comments Threshold 
 
type 
Average # 
political 
  comments  
 
%encouraging 
 
%rowdy 
 
%response 
 
%criticism(admin) 
Entertainment Average 72 4 35 20 4 
Political Page Average 147 2 30 14 3 
Sports Page Average 203 8 45 28 4 
 
 
The averages at the post level also confirm the point I made earlier. Average percent of 
explicit encouragement of different perspectives is highest on the sports pages with 8% 
compared to the 2% on overtly political pages and 4% on entertainment pages. On average, 
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rowdiness is somewhat common on all the page types even if the sports pages host the highest 
percentage of rowdy comments. 
The table above also suggests that the percentage of responsiveness on average is the 
highest in sports pages. People on sports pages responded to each other twice as much compared 
to overtly political pages. These findings suggest that we might find more deliberative talk on 
sports pages once a political conversation starts. 
Rowdy Deliberative Talk 
 
Depending on the context, incivility and even a discourse of outrage might go hand in 
hand with deliberative talk. In order to demonstrate this point I combined the variables of civility 
and outrage and called it rowdy. Below table demonstrates cross tabulation of rowdy with 
deliberation status as well as deliberative talk. 
Table 6. Rowdy Deliberative Talk 
Deliberation 
Status 
Sports Entertainment Political 
Rowdy Non-rowdy Rowdy Non-rowdy Rowdy Non-rowdy 
Discouraging 120 (84%) 23 (16%) 85 (86%) 14 (14%) 238(83%) 50(17%) 
Neutral 623 (41%) 894 (59%) 277 (35%) 516 (65%) 2177 (38%) 3514(62%) 
Encouraging 38 (29%) 93 (71%) 2 (7%) 28 (93%) 27(21%) 101(79%) 
Deliberative Talk       
no 615 (44%) 795(56%) 312(40%) 462(60%) 2200(40%) 3292 (60%) 
yes 168 (44%) 215 (56%) 52(35%) 98(65%) 243(39%) 377(61%) 
Total 781 (44%) 1010 (56%) 364(39%) 558 (61%) 2442 (40%) 3665(60%) 
 
 
Table above suggests that there are quite a few instances where we see rowdy political 
talk combined with the encouragement of deliberative status. Also, the fact that a comment is 
rowdy does not automatically discourage deliberative talk. In majority of the cases those rowdy 
comments were neutral in terms of deliberation status. There is also an interesting difference 
between the sports pages and the overtly political pages. While 5 % of the comments on sports 
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pages were instances of rowdy talk that explicitly encouraged deliberation, only 1% of the 
comments in the overly political pages fell into this category. 
Furthermore, logistic regression results suggest that holding other variables constant 
rowdiness does not have a significant negative effect on deliberative talk on sports pages while it 
continues to have some effect on entertainment and political pages. 
Table 7. Logistic Regression 
Deliberative Talk For all 
groups 
Entertainment Sports  
   Political 
rowdy -.40*** -.68** -.24 -.42*** 
 (.07) (0.22) (.13) (.10) 
emotional support -1.73*** -2.05* -.55 -1.78*** 
 (.15) (1.02) (.77) (.16) 
  Us/them      
in-group 0.07 .94* .46* -.11 
 (.10) (.38) (.21) (.13) 
out-group 1.07*** 1.19*** 1.17*** .98*** 
 (.11) (.29) (.19) (.17) 
criticism -.35** -.52 -.33 -.42 
 (.13) (.44) (.16) (.29) 
  page type      
sports .38***    
 (.10)    
political -.23*    
 (.10)    
constant -1.57*** -1.52*** -1.30*** -1.75*** 
 (.09) (.11) (.07) (.05) 
Observations 8828 922 1791 6105 
Legend: * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001 
Coefficients are presented above with standard errors in parentheses. 
[I ran lrtest to test the fitness of the model. The additive model with all the variables I 
have (new deliberation variable, rowdiness, emotional support, usthem and criticism) was 
the best fit. Moreover, there weren’t any significant interaction effects between the co- 
variates.] 
 
 
In the general model, holding other variables constant rowdiness and strong emotional 
support have a negative association with deliberative talk. Compared to the entertainment pages, 
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sport pages look like a more likely ground for deliberative talk. Overtly political pages on the 
other hand are less likely to host deliberative talk compared to the entertainment pages. If I 
change the reference group to overtly political pages, both entertainment and sports pages are 
shown to be more likely to host deliberative talk compared to political pages. 
When I calculate the odds ratios based on the above table, the odds ratio of deliberative 
talk is 3 to 1 if there is out-group us/them distinction compared to making no us/them 
distinctions. Strong emotional support on the other hand decreases the probability of deliberative 
talk considerably. The probability of deliberative talk is 0.17. 
Most important finding for the comparison of logistic regression results for different page 
types (demonstrated in the last three columns of the above table) is related to rowdiness. As I 
have suggested in the above paragraphs that in general rowdiness seem to have a negative 
association with deliberative talk. However that association becomes insignificant in the sports 
pages. This confirms my second hypothesis. Rowdiness might not discourage deliberative talk 
depending on the groups contexts. 
Table 8. Predicted Probability of Deliberative Talk by 
Page Group 
 Margins Standard Errors  
Entertainment .13*** .010  
Sports .18*** .008  
Political .11*** .004  
 
 
Table above shows the predicted probability of a comment to be deliberative. The 
probability is highest for the sports pages while it is the lowest for the overtly political pages. 
Hypothesis 1 suggested that we are more likely to see deliberative talk in non-political settings 
because the basis of the group would not be political so there would not be an incentive to create 
“echo chambers.” Hypothesis 1 is confirmed: We are more likely to find deliberative talk in 
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non-political settings, especially sports. However, it is somewhat partially confirmed because 
the predicted probability of a comment to be encouraging deliberative political talk on 
entertainment pages is not very different from the overtly political pages. As I discussed in the 
qualitative section, the difference between the sports and entertainment pages lies in the degree 
to which politics is considered to be an appropriate topic for conversation. 
If the group identity is not based on politics and political talk is not looked down upon, 
we are more likely to see deliberative talk compared to overtly political pages. This is the case 
with sports pages. 
In conclusion, based on the results of descriptive analysis and the logistic regression 
results there is support for two of the hypotheses presented in the conceptual framework. If there 
is a group identity that is not based on politics (as in the case of sports pages) and political talk is 
not deemed inappropriate we are more likely to see deliberative talk. This likelihood is 
demonstrated in relation to overtly political pages (where the basis of the page is political) as 
well as the entertainment pages (the page is not based on a political position but political talk is 
not particularly encouraged) 
Moreover, contrary to the expectations of the rational critical model of deliberative talk, 
incivility and discourse of outrage do not necessarily preclude deliberative talk. It depends on the 
norms of talking (or in this case commenting) on a given setting. As in the case of sports pages 
one can find rowdy deliberative talk. Discourse of outrage and incivility as characteristics of 
comments do not have a significant relationship with the comments that encourage presentation 
of different ideas not represented by the main line in the group or not supported by one’s own 
views. Rowdiness is not necessarily against the norms of talk set by the users in these sports 
pages, consequently we see rowdy deliberative talk on sports pages. 
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CHAPTER 5: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
This part of the paper takes a conversation analysis approach. It approaches the data as a 
collaborative construction of conversation that is naturally taking place.(Heritage and Greatbatch 
1986; Krippendorff 2012) The texts do not have a single meaning but are subjected to numerous 
perspectives, which are shaped through the conversation itself. In this respect the norms of the 
Facebook page, the norms attributed to the topic in that specific Facebook page as well as how 
the comments are embedded in conversations matter. However, this paper does not focus on the 
audience reception but rather focuses on the characteristics of conversations which are “context 
shaped and context renewing.”(Goodwin and Heritage 1990) The conversations in the Facebook 
pages determine and reflect the norms of talk on these pages and as I will demonstrate below 
there are mechanisms of compliance with those norms while being simultaneously challenged 
and negotiated. 
When and How Appropriate it is to Talk about Politics 
 
As Eliasoph indicates, political conversations are shaped/ governed by the people 
following certain etiquettes which “implicitly [take] into account a relationship to the wider 
world: politeness, beliefs, and power intertwine in practice, through this sense of civility.” As I 
argue in the conceptual framework, what would be considered incivility or outrage might be 
part of a proper/ acceptable etiquette in some contexts. Soccer fans are for example notorious 
for the use of uncivil language especially when chanting in the stadiums.11 On Facebook it 
would still be acceptable to use somewhat uncivil language especially when talking about the 
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other teams. I have demonstrated in the quantitative analysis section that on soccer pages 
incivility does not correlate with a lack of deliberating talk. 
There are mixed feelings among the Facebook users on sports pages about the 
appropriateness of political talk but discussions continued even when some users indicated that 
they did not find it appropriate. 
“Don’t be a partisan on a soccer page. This is the page of Galatasaray. If you want to do 
politics go to the page of CHP, go to the page of AKP, go to the page of MHP. You are 
making foolish comments. You will accuse the prime minister even when you slide and 
fall. [even when it is just an accident] It is enough to make a saint swear. Be 
reasonable!”12 
Here the soccer club’s page is not seen as an appropriate place to comment on politics. 
Still, despite this comment some of the users continued to discuss politics on the same post and 
they did not suffer any retribution. This might have a signaling effect on other users. Continued 
political discussion even in the presence of such a criticism would indicate that a lot of people 
don’t agree with that comment and it is ok to talk politics on that specific page. 
An example from Entertainment pages also demonstrates instances where a page’s 
administrator can also start a political conversation and yet most of the users might choose to 
ignore the political content. On October 17, an entertainment page that specialize on jokes, funny 
photos and videos post a joke with the title of “if oil/gas prices go up like this...”. The post was a 
picture of an empty highway where there are two silhouettes over looking the picture: a man and 
a girl. The man tells the child “years ago when oil prices were below 10 TL there used be cars 
going down this road.” This triggers some political conversation about price increases, 
corruption, economic policies and apathy of the citizens to take action. After some political 
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comments (22) the conversation on the post turned into quotidian greetings and chat among the 
users. 
These examples illustrate an overall trend I observed in the conversations I analyzed. 
 
Most of the users consider entertainment pages as inappropriate venues to discuss politics. 
Political conversations might not be picked up or in some cases just declared to be inappropriate. 
However, in sports pages there were mixed feelings and mixed practices. When a political issue 
is brought up in most of the instances I analyzed people would respond (though not always). 
Especially when the issue is a contentious and sensitive one, some users would also voice their 
concerns that the sports pages are not the place to do partisan politics. However, even when there 
were such interventions conversations continued in a heated fashion, which indicates an 
openness to discuss politics. 
Us/Them Distinctions and Inter-Ideological Conversations 
 
There are different types of in-group us/them distinctions. In the first type the in-group 
distinction might be made in order to maintain the group unity. “This is how we are.” On the 
other hand, in-group us/them distinctions might also be made by highlighting the differences 
among the members of the in-group. The way these distinctions are used also give us clues about 
the nature of inter-ideological conversations. 
In certain instances of boundary drawing, “us” could refer to a within group differences. 
It might mean Turkish Galatasaray fans versus Kurdish Galatasaray fans or pro-AKP Galatasaray 
fans vs anti-AKP Galatasaray fans. Again in reference to armory explosion and the claims that 
PKK might be the culprit, discussions about the meaning of being Turkish and Kurdish arose.13 
This outburst was followed by further discussions about the “Kurdish issue” as a side 
conversation while people just cut the conversation to announce their condolences for the 
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families of the soldiers who died in the explosion. This highly controversial conversation did not 
lead to threats of banning from the page even if the tone of the conversation remained to reflect 
heightened emotional responses and outrage. 
In-group solidarity might also be invoked to appease what is perceived to be polarizing 
discourses and encourage deliberative talk: 
“Why the word Tanrı is bothering you friends? When you say Allah does anyone put 
pressure on you to not use Allah. Not everybody has to think the way you do??”14 
In a similar fashion who “we” are as Galatasay fans or as Turkish citizens can be invoked to 
overcome the ongoing discussion threaten the solidarity of the group: 
“Well, brother, there are non-Muslims among the martyrs as well and they use Tanrı, 
why are you such bone heads, ok we say Allah but they say Tanrı, we are all talking 
about the same creator.”15 
Intra-ideological conversations on the other hand might show themselves on overtly 
political pages. On the page of Mehmetcik, one can observe a very frequent usage of 
“kardesim”(brother/sister) especially in nonpolitical posts. Common denominator in this page is 
the experience with the mandatory military service: these are either people who have done or are 
currently doing their military service or have relatives who are conscripted. The overall tone of 
the talks is very strongly Turkish nationalist and the most common outside group (which is 
usually mentioned with a discourse of outrage) is the Kurdish separationist group of PKK. In one 
of the conversation threads on September 6, people discuss their opinions of nationalist policies 
of the two right wing parties, MHP and AKP: 
Mhp Mhp that is all you mention. We have seen both MHP and AKP. Martyr after 
martyrs. Without discovering the real truth you took over all the police and the military. 
If you are the sultan, come on hang apo! [leader of PKK who is currently in prison]16 
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However, even intra-ideological conversations might be deemed inappropriate in overtly 
political pages and comments can be deleted: 
“You know very well how to delete the comments you don’t like. I didn’t hold the 
opposition party responsible for what has happened. This is not something you can 
mention and pass with a couple of words. If needed, you will take the millions who voted 
for you to the streets. CHP is not the place to laze around.”17 
This is an indication of a comment deleted before, on the grounds of its intra-ideological 
content even if it was not a direct attack on the party in question. As can be seen in these 
examples, us/them distinctions are made in quite an intricate way. Both in-group and out-group 
references might be used to encourage inter-ideological conversations. Likewise they might be 
used to discourage such conversations as well. The way these distinctions are made might signify 
inter-ideological or intra-ideological stances and may indicate whether those positions are 
welcome in a given conversation. 
Indirect Discouragement of Deliberative Talk 
 
Indirect discouragement might take the form of strong emotional support especially in 
overtly political pages. One example is the conversations that take place in Prime Minister’s 
page. On November 1st there were two posts about Prime Minister’s meeting with the Turkish 
president and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. There were no visible criticisms but the 
comments were marked by euphoria and strong emotional support to the Prime Minister. 
Comment after comment users were writing about their veneration of the persona of Erdoğan. It 
seems that the norm on this page is set so that even if somebody wants to ask for a certain 
favorable policy they frame it after glorifying Erdoğan. In such cases where there is such a 
strong support and in-group solidarity, even intra-ideological questioning does not exist. 
Example of a strong emotional support would be: 
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“Look at the divine light on their faces, my friends. Their faces shine not like the moon 
but like the sun in August.” [indicating that it burns very brightly as a sign of divinity] 
Consequently, even if there is some ideological fragmentation on the overtly political 
pages it is mostly in the form of intra-ideological questioning. In some cases even this intra- 
ideological questioning might be discouraged by the dominance of strong emotional support for 
the ideological line or the party leader. There is not much room for inter-ideological 
conversations. 
Rowdy Deliberation on Sports Pages 
 
In my discussion of us/them distinctions I already suggested how group identity might be 
deployed for deliberative talk. In one of the instances I mentioned above a user refer to his fellow 
fans as “brother/sister” and “bone heads” at the same time because they made us/them 
distinctions earlier in such a way as to discourage a certain political position. 
“Well, brother, there are non-Muslims among the martyrs as well and they use 
Tanrı, why are you such bone heads, ok we say Allah but they say Tanrı, we are 
all talking about the same creator.” 
This is one of the examples of how rowdiness could be part of deliberative talk that 
encourages inter-ideological dialogue and engages with different political positions. 
These types of comments especially come up when uncivil and/or outraged discourse 
threaten the perceived unity of the group. On Besiktas’s page, as a response to the heated 
discussions about who to blame for the explosion in the military armory when a user called 
another one stupid [which might have silenced that user] another fan responds: 
“Don’t do this my friends. We all are suffering. Don’t do this. How many 
sacrifices should be made for us to wake up, this is not the place. 25 lives. Our 
brothers are gone, our heroes are gone, don’t do this.” 
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In the same conversation, there were also instances of a discourse of outrage that started a 
parallel conversation about what the fans themselves can do about the situation: 
“What can Besiktas do for the martyr, in other words what can we do, can you tell 
me? Just condolences and condemnation, I am sick and tired of hearing these two 
words. We no longer have a heroic Turkey but a helpless Turkey.” 
Similar conversations occurred in Galatasaray’s and Fenerbahce’s pages as well. For 
example, on Fenerbahce’s page, in one of the instances some people were discussing the 
organization of a symbolic march for the dead soldiers. Some others were blaming the 
government oversight when a user made the following comment: “God willing, this nation will 
wake up [from ignorance]” which received a skeptical and yet positively engaging response: 
“You wish my brother/sister! You [keep] wish[ing] as long as this government 
stays in power!” 
This is a clear case of outrage in the form of overgeneralization and reflection of anger 
and yet this comment was used in an engaging manner which contributed to the encouragement 
of deliberative talk. 
In conclusion, in this section I tried to show the complexity of discursive boundaries 
established, maintained and reproduced on the Facebook pages. Depending on the context and 
the norms of acceptable behavior on a Facebook page discourse of outrage, incivility and 
us/them distinctions might be used for the encouragement of deliberative talk. Breaking news, as 
a contextual characteristic is important to consider when political talk in non-political platforms 
are analyzed and yet the presence of breaking news does not guarantee political talk. (see 
appendix) In general, entertainment pages are not considered to be appropriate venues for 
political discussion while the presence of political talk on sports pages is a controversial topic. 
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The difference between these two attitudes, on the other hand, help us understand why we are 
more likely to see deliberative talk on sports pages but not on entertainment pages as I discussed 
in the quantitative analysis section. If political talk is seen as inappropriate (as in the case of 
Entertainment pages) then deliberative talk as a form of political talk would not be encouraged 
either. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION: CLUB MODEL AND FACEBOOK PAGES 
 
Scholars who study deliberative democracy put a lot of emphasis on the importance of 
political talk. The way people talk about politics shape and reflect how they think about politics 
as well as how they practice politics. Talking politics is also a discursive act, which is closely 
tied to the discussions of political engagement. There is, however, an important concern when it 
comes to the analysis of political talk that people talk about politics with like-minded individuals 
creating echo chambers, the boundaries of which is heavily guarded by group dynamics. Since 
deliberative talk occurs quite rarely, do we expect to see it diminish further as a result of echo 
chambers? 
Maybe not. I argue that we can analyze the way political talk takes place on Facebook 
pages like a club model. Influential insiders shape the conversation and create/enforce the norm 
of conduct through their practices. Moreover, just like different types of clubs, they are also quite 
different in how they accept outsiders to become insiders. Surprisingly, from the perspective of 
political talk, the pages that actually are related to real clubs (sports clubs pages) are the ones that 
seem to be the most inclusive. 
The term club model is used in the international relations literature in reference to how 
international organizations work.(Keohane and Nye Jr 2002) In some cases, international 
organizations work as a club of negotiators. In such club-like organizations a group of very 
influential actors come together and negotiate the rules of the game. For example, in the second 
half of the 20th century, “issue areas” start to emerge within the international organizations. 
While some of them are open to all, some others require certain accreditation qualities, which are 
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determined by the members who are already in the club. Vertically, in these latter types of issue 
areas the interaction is concentrated within the club even if that club is part of a larger 
organization. This has a horizontal effect as well. Even in the national domestic politics of the 
members of the organization, the club carries a lot of weight on the specific area because the 
decision the club makes is presented to the citizenry as a fait accompli. 
The Facebook pages I discussed above work quite like the club model. These pages are 
open to public; they are open to all Facebook users. There are no formal rules that would turn 
them into clubs in the sense that participation is not subjected to predetermined criteria. 
However, if we look closely at the way interactions occur, the regulars of the page indeed turn 
them into clubs where those who do not comply with a certain criterion is heavily looked down 
upon and discouraged to participate in different ways. 
As the scholars who support echo chambers argument suggest, deliberative talk is quite 
rare especially in overtly political pages. However, we can also find deliberative talk in non- 
political pages. Sports pages are more likely grounds of deliberative talk than the overtly 
political ones when political conversations are picked up. As I have discussed earlier sport pages 
do not represent a dominant political ideology. They are not affiliated with a certain political 
party. The discussions that occur on these sports pages reflect inter-ideological conversations 
much more than the overtly political pages. In contrast to the focus in the literature, the analysis 
suggest that we are more likely to find deliberative political talk in sports pages even if 
deliberative talk is rare to come by in general. 
What type of deliberative talk we see is the next question. When we allow deliberative 
talk (that encourages, tolerates and engages with inter-ideological questioning) to reflect 
characteristics of outrage and incivility we see the cases of rowdy deliberative talk especially on 
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sports pages. That has a lot to do with the accepted norms of behavior on these pages. The 
tendency in the literature to insist on the criteria of civility and rationality in political discussions 
is an important constraint on the analysis of everyday life political talk because it disregards the 
possibilities and repertoires of speech acts in different everyday life contexts. As I have 
demonstrated in the previous sections we can also see rowdy deliberative talk that would include 
elements of incivility and outrage and yet would still encourage inter-ideological questioning. 
In other words, we are more likely to come across deliberative political talk on the pages 
that are not based on politics exclusively if political talk is seen appropriate to be held. In the 
cases I analyzed sports pages fit the bill unlike the entertainment pages. Due to the nature of talk 
on those pages we are also more likely to see rowdy deliberative talk, which makes inter- 
ideological questioning possible unlike the overtly political pages. I emphasized the importance 
of context throughout this paper. Considering the fact that the perception of Turkish political 
scene is quite polarized, I would expect to see deliberative talk in different political contexts as 
well. 
Nevertheless, there are certain limitations to this study. Due to privacy concerns I could 
not gather data on the Newsfeed flows which might give us clues about the nature of political 
talk a user is exposed to in her own Facebook circle (Facebook friends.) If we were able to 
monitor Facebook Newsfeed activities we could have also seen which posts a user choose to 
respond to. That exposure/ response dynamic as well as the type of posts the user herself creates 
could also provide an additional context of political talk, which goes in parallel to the political 
talk on public pages. 
In addition to scrutinizing the parallel political talk between public pages and private 
circles, it would be also interesting to see the overall distribution of political talk over a long 
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period of time. Under which conditions political talk starts in non-political settings? In doing so, 
scholars can analyze what sorts of topics trigger political talk and how the tone of political talk 
differs in relation to the topics of discussion. In this paper I captured a fragment of political talk 
in relation to unfolding events. I demonstrated that we see deliberative political talk in non- 
political venues. The type of deliberative talk may differ in different Facebook pages based on 
the norms set by the group following a club model type of dynamic. Still the question remains to 
be explored as to what type of deliberative talk is more likely to occur in relation to group 
solidarity and the political topic. 
In this paper I also did not make any claims about the degree of solidarity in these pages. 
 
Is there a difference between the strength of solidarity found in sports pages vis-a-vis 
entertainment pages? Does it affect the acceptability of political talk? If there is a strong group 
identity that is not based on politics (as in the case of sports pages) we might be more likely to 
see deliberative talk. Perhaps in-group solidarity is not as strong on entertainment pages 
compared to the fandom of sports clubs. What also remains to be seen is how deliberative 
political talk fares when there is no strong group identity and the basis of the page is political. 
Unfortunately my data did not provide such a case to be analyzed. 
My findings also have some practical implications for deliberation. In order to capitalize 
on the potential of deliberative talk as an important component of strengthening democratic 
culture and practices, we need to pay more attention to non-political venues. This includes 
paying attention to different features of potentially deliberative talk, inter and intra-ideological 
discussions as well as the contextual dynamics. Finally the approach I take here would help 
illuminate the mechanisms through which people talk about politics. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Top 50 Facebook Pages in Turkey 
Rank Likes Name category description 
1 7,601,828 Galatasaray sports sports club (soccer) 
2 6,118,335 Fenerbahçe sports sports club (soccer) 
3 3,754,130 Beşiktaş sports sport club (soccer) 
4 3,649,846 Okey entertainment game 
5 3,734,061 Emre Aydın music singer 
6 3,691,187 Cem Yılmaz entertainment comedian 
7 3,529,068 Atatürk politics first president of the Republic of Turkey 
8 2,925,498 MaNga music music band 
9 2,850,958 Her Gün 1 Yeni Bilgi entertainment trivia 
10 2,945,796 Hz. Muhammed religion prophet [Islam] 
11 2,644,632 Çok Güzel Hareketler Bunlar entertainment comedy show 
12 2,676,736 Mehmetçik politics support for soldiers/army 
13 2,478,458 İzlesene.com entertainment TV series & movies 
14 2,490,798 Alex de Souza sports soccer player 
15 2,280,106 Beyazıt Öztürk entertainment comedian 
16 2,359,640 Sıla music singer 
17 2,291,366 Edebiyat kulübü literature literature club-daily quotations 
18 2,500,669 Dr.Mehmet Oz health doctor 
19 2,048,888 Arda Turan sports soccer player 
20 2,304,901 Aşk Tesadüfleri Sever entertainment movie 
21 2,054,668 Volkan Konak music singer 
22 1,968,676 Namaz religion praying 
23 1,904,668 Avea commercial mobile operator 
24 1,825,439 Engelliler için Elele campaign campaign to support the disabled 
25 1,876,392 Kurtlar Vadisi entertainment TV series 
26 1,831,495 Felsefe Kulübü philosophy philosophy club-daily quotations 
27 1,779,799 Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu entertainment TV Series 
28 1,678,671 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan politics Prime Minister 
29 2,155,897 Beren Saat entertainment actress 
30 1,540,613 Müzik Keyfi music music 
31 1,594,920 Teoman music singer 
32 1,517,810 Can Yücel literature poet 
33 1,439,962 Zapkolik entertainment TV series & movies 
34 1,482,549 Mynet Çanak Okey entertainment game 
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35 1,577,958 Pis Yedili entertainment TV show 
36 2,042,516 Turkcell commercial mobile operator 
37 1,375,598 Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu politics leader of the main opposition party-CHP 
38 1,348,358 komik ve ilginç videolar entertainment funny videos 
39 1,547,776 Tuba Büyüküstün entertainment actress 
40 1,369,353 ultraaslan sports soccer fan club 
41 1,266,516 Komedi Dükkanı entertainment comedy show 
42 1,263,559 Çikolata food chocolate 
43 1,338,578 Ersin Korkut entertainment comedian 
44 1,504,988 Nokia Türkiye commercial mobile phone company 
45 1,457,472 hacı kop devir kopma devri entertainment funny videos 
46 0 Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri politics Turkish army 
47 1,269,490 Gripin music music band 
48 1,648,590 Volkswagen Türkiye commercial automobile company 
49 1,256,436 Halil Sezai music singer 
50 1,264,754 Gökhan Türkmen music Singer 
Source: http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-pages/turkey/ (ranking 29 August 2012, 
number of likes 20 November 2012) 
The page ranking 18 on the list will not be considered in the analysis because the page is 
categorized from Turkey due to the ethnicity of the person but it is closely related to an 
American TV show on health. It is followed by some Turkish users as well but they are much 
fewer than the total number of users who liked the page so the page wouldn’t be in top 50. 
Beyazit Ozturk’s page (ranked 15), Beren Saat’s page (ranked 29), and Çikolata (ranked 42) do 
not post and Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (ranked 46) no longer exists. Kurtlar Vadisi (ranked 25) is a 
popular TV show and Kurtlar Vadisi Pusu (ranked 27) is a sequel. These two pages are merged 
on Facebook so the total number of pages is dropped down to 44. 
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Table 2. Pages and the Frequency of Political Comments 
 political   
page no yes Total 
CemYilmaz-Dec26 52 0 52 
ArdaTuran-Dec26 139 0 139 
ArdaTuran-Nov20 382 0 382 
ArdaTuran-Sep6 155 0 155 
Besiktas-Dec26 348 7 355 
Besiktas-Nov1 195 0 195 
Besiktas-Nov20 244 2 246 
Besiktas-Oct17 415 0 415 
Besiktas-Sep6 370 88 458 
CGHB-Dec26 36 0 36 
CGHB-Nov1 94 0 94 
CGHB-Nov20 55 0 55 
CGHB-Oct17 76 0 76 
CanYucel-Sep6 45 0 45 
CanakOkey-Dec26 175 0 175 
CanakOkey-Oct17 57 0 57 
Edebiyat-Dec26 849 0 849 
Edebiyat-Nov1 1,517 6 1,523 
Edebiyat-Nov20 1,118 16 1,134 
Edebiyat-Oct17 1,217 10 1,227 
Edebiyat-Sep6 427 194 621 
EmreAydin-Sep6 11 65 76 
Felsefe-Dec26 355 10 365 
Felsefe-Nov20 379 5 384 
Felsefe-Oct17 398 45 443 
Felsefe-Sep6 180 77 257 
Fenerbahce-Dec26 1,274 2 1,276 
Fenerbahce-Nov1 717 4 721 
Fenerbahce-Nov20 1,115 3 1,118 
Fenerbahce-Oct17 422 0 422 
Fenerbahce-Sep6 1,502 306 1,808 
Galatasaray- Oct17 2,670 55 2,725 
Galatasaray-Dec26 4,107 2 4,109 
Galatasaray-Nov1 2,354 20 2,374 
Galatasaray-Nov20 4,508 45 4,553 
Galatasaray-Sep6 3,390 1,145 4,535 
GokhanTurkmen-Dec26 34 0 34 
GokhanTurkmen-Nov20 61 0 61 
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GokhanTurkmen-Oct17 16 1 17 
Gripin-Dec26 24 0 24 
Gripin-Nov1 27 0 27 
Hacikop-Dec26 2,261 9 2,270 
Hacikop-Nov1 7,347 158 7,505 
Hacikop-Nov20 4,875 0 4,875 
Hacikop-Oct17 8,708 46 8,754 
Hacikop-Sep6 2,075 22 2,097 
HalilSezai-Nov1 30 0 30 
HalilSezai-Nov20 31 0 31 
Izlesene-Dec26 702 0 702 
Izlesene-Nov20 241 0 241 
Izlesene-Oct17 40 0 40 
Izlesene-Sep6 1,639 154 1,793 
Kilicdaroglu-Dec26 8 106 114 
Kilicdaroglu-Nov1 5 117 122 
Kilicdaroglu-Nov20 7 247 254 
Kilicdaroglu-Sep6 3 490 493 
KurtlarVadisi-Dec26 236 4 240 
KurtlarVadisi-Nov20 153 0 153 
KurtlarVadisi-Sep6 206 0 206 
Manga-Nov1 33 0 33 
Manga-Nov20 14 0 14 
Mehmetcik-Dec26 692 977 1,669 
Mehmetcik-Nov20 2,392 1,672 4,064 
Mehmetcik-Oct17 361 490 851 
Mehmetcik-Sep6 703 885 1,588 
Namaz-Dec26 20 0 20 
Namaz-Nov1 36 0 36 
Namaz-Nov20 73 25 98 
Namaz-Oct17 109 137 246 
Namaz-Sep6 66 14 80 
Okey-Dec26 432 0 432 
Okey-Nov1 302 0 302 
Okey-Nov20 1,407 10 1,417 
PisYedili-Dec26 675 0 675 
PisYedili-Oct17 195 0 195 
PisYedili-Sep6 137 0 137 
RTE- Nov1 32 492 524 
RTE-Dec26 8 65 73 
RTE-Nov20 5 273 278 
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RTE-Oct17 5 121 126 
Teoman-Dec26 15 1 16 
Teoman-Nov20 43 0 43 
Teoman-Sep6 35 0 35 
TubaBuyukustun-Nov20 15 0 15 
Ultraaslan-Nov1 45 0 45 
Ultraaslan-Nov20 705 2 707 
Ultraaslan-Oct17 394 0 394 
Ultraaslan-Sep6 103 87 190 
Ultraslan-Dec26 211 25 236 
VolkanKonak-Nov1 47 0 47 
VolkanKonak-Nov20 885 0 885 
VolkanKonak-Oct17 25 0 25 
Zapkolik-Nov20 12 0 12 
Zapkolik-Sep6 7 91 98 
Total 70,316 8,828 79,144 
 
 
 
Table 3. Political Comments by Dates and Facebook Page Types  
   
Date Entertainment Sports Political Total 
December 26 24 36 1148 1208 
November 20 31 52 2217 2300 
November 1 164 24 609 797 
October 17 102 55 748 905 
September 6 603 1626 1389 3618 
Total 924 1793 6111 8828 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Earlier versions of this paper has been presented in American Sociological Association 
Annual Meeting in New York (2013) and European Consortium for Political Research 
Meeting, Bordeaux, France (2013). I would like to thank UNC European Union Center of 
Excellence for the conference travel grant. 
2“We have been sadly informed that as a result of an explosion in Afyonkarahisar, 25 of 
our soldiers became martyrs and 4 of our soldiers have been wounded. We ask mercy 
from God for the martyrs, wish quick recovery for the wounded.” 
Afyonkarahisar'da meydana gelen patlamada, 25 askerimizin şehit olduğunu, 4 
askerimizin de yaralandığını büyük üzüntüyle öğrenmiş bulunuyoruz. Şehitlerimize 
Tanrı'dan rahmet, yaralı asker ve sivil vatandaşımıza acil şifalar dilerken, şehit 
ailelerine başsağlığı ve sabır dileriz. 
3 http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/turkey [retrieved on 13 February 2014] (Turkey ranked 
seventh on October 4, 2012 according to same website) 
4  http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/02/13/emerging-nations-embrace-internet-mobile-technology/ 
5  http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/02/13/emerging-nations-embrace-internet-mobile-technology/ 
6The ranking is taken from socialbakers which is a marketing company focusing on the 
social media analytics. It claims to track more than 10 million Facebook pages all over 
the world and is treated as a relatively credible source of social media trends. 
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7Not all pages make posts, they might be dormant so the pages I have data on and the 
complete list of top 50 are not the same. For further discussion, please see the data 
section of the quantitative analysis. 
8Some of the most interesting discussions under study in this paper occurred in those 
pages in the form of rowdy deliberation. All three of the major teams I discuss here were 
established at the turn of the century (Besiktas 1903, Fenerbahce 1908 and Galatasaray 
1905) in the Ottoman Empire. In the Early Republican period soccer was an elite sport. 
Galatasaray and Besiktas started as gymnastic clubs and the former was restricted to the 
students and the alumni of Galatasaray high school. However, this elite basis of the early 
days of the sports teams changed dramatically over the 20th century. The membership to 
these sports clubs no longer requires any other affiliation. They are mainly known for 
their soccer teams, which are referred as the “big three” due to their success in the 
national soccer league (they almost have a monopoly on the championship in the last 
decades). Soccer and fandom is mostly discussed in relation to the identity building 
performances (Gigone and Hastie 1993; Maass and Arcuri 1996; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, 
Lüthgens, and Moscovici 2000; Wittenbaum, Hubbell, and Zuckerman 1999), 
violence(Gigone and Hastie 1997; Nemeth and Rogers 1996), or nationalism / racism 
among soccer fans and the sports press.(Gökacti 2008; Haslam, Oakes, and Turner 1996; 
Kassimeris 2011; Martin 2004; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Testa and Armstrong 2010; 
Wittenbaum, Hubbell, and Zuckerman 1999). Soccer and politics is also studied from the 
perspective of usage of soccer references by the politicians(Hendriks 2006), collective 
memory construction of the fan groups(Hacısoftaoğlu, Akcan, and Bulgu 2012) or 
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distinct identity positions taken by certain fan groups. (Erhart 2013; McManus 
2013)There are also a few studies which look at soccer and its fans as a reflection of 
broader societal differences and conflicts(Gastil 2000; Goodin and Dryzek 2006) or the 
intersection of oppositional politics, protest and soccer(Edwards and Smith 1996; Gaines, 
Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, and Verkuilen 2007; Redlawsk 2002; Taber and Lodge 2006). 
934 is the traffic code of Istanbul which symbolizes the slogan used by some of the fans 
during the Gezi Park protests: “Istanbul United.” It is very significant since there used to 
be violent clashes and bloodshed between the fans of the “big three” especially in the 
1990s. I also need to open a parenthesis here specifically for Carsi fan group. A in Carsi’s 
name is written with the anarchist symbol and it also incorporates some leftist discourses 
and causes. Its slogan is Carsi, her seye karsi. (Carsi, against everything). In line with the 
Ultra movement they are also against the commercialization of soccer. However, the 
leftist slogans and leftist positions in politics (through the banners and slogans they use in 
the games) are not always consistent and sometimes it blended with ultranationalist and 
religious discourses. Here are a few references on the political tenstions in the tribunes 
and how some soccer fans protested by chanting anti-government slogans and how some 
other fans opposed it. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/spor/2013/09/130923_bjk_gs_tepkiler.shtml (access 26 
January 2014); http://skorer.milliyet.com.tr/kadikoy-de-tribunler-karisti- 
/fenerbahce/detay/1754326/default.htm (access 26 January 2014); 
http://skorer.milliyet.com.tr/tt-arena-da-siyasi- 
gerilim/galatasaray/detay/1752112/default.htm (access 26 January 2014) 
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10Ultras refer to a broader movement that is named in Italy in 1950s and influenced 
European soccer fan culture in 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Ultras are defined as a devoted 
fan group mainly known for colorful stadium choreography in support of their team, 
sometimes associated with fanaticism and hooliganism. However, most ultra groups 
declare that they embrace the anti-racist, anti-nationalist and anti-capitalist values since 
racism and capitalism ruin the game, which is supposed to be a game for all. (Kennedy 
and Kennedy 2013). 
11A similar campaign was initiated on Twitter. It drew support from some Beşiktaş fans 
with the campaign called “BEŞİKTAŞlı adının başına TC Yazıyor.” (Besiktas supporters 
write TC infront fo their names) Based on the references used in the calls for that 
campaign the discourses was along neo-Kemalist lines. The removal of TC was 
considered to be a symbolic attack to the republic by AKP administration. On the Twitter 
campaign members of Çarşı were quite visible in their calls. 
12Uncivil slogans, especially cursing, and violence in the stadiums has been a concern of 
the Turkish Football Federation. (TFF) Turkish teams in the past received penalties from 
the Union of European Football Federations (UEFA) in the form of monetary penalties or 
in some instances Turkish teams had to play matches without spectators. Recently TFF 
declared that they are introducing a zero-cursing policy to the stadiums by enforcing 
stricter penalties. (http://spor.haberturk.com/futbol/haber/914826-tffden-surpriz- 
degisiklik[retrieved 14 February 2014]). 
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136 September 2012. Galatasaray. “bu futbol sayfasinda particilik yapmayin burasi 
galatasaray sayfasi siyaset yapacaksan git chp nin akp nin mhp nin sayfasina aptal aptal 
yorumlar 
yapiyosunuz ayaginiz kayip dusseniz basbakan yapti diyeceksiniz insani dinden imandan 
cikarmayin el insaf ya” 
14Bir damla göz yaşı döktünüz mü, Roboski de Battaniyelere sarılmış, katır ile insanların 
karışmış yanık etlerini görünce? ozeman roboskideki 33 gencecik dah cocuktular kimse 
buna tepki ver ede türk halki gözünü kapati medayallar sustu sizin o basbakniz cikti 
medaya karsisina dedi yaslnis anlasilmama oldu hic bir ölüm kaza deyil onur almimisin 
herneysen herseyi gerillad bulmayin önce kendi devletinizin derin pisliklerini arstirin 
ondan sonar gel burda artislik yap daha kac gün eval sizin devletiniz dedi bir kac asker 
öldüdiye keyfimizi bozamyiz meclisi topliyamayiz niye demsin cünkü ölen asker onun 
evladi deyildi onun yüreyi yanmamis öyle der onun icn birakin bu fasa fiso lafllari vatn 
sag olsun didiginiz sürec dah cok canllar yanacak BIR TÜK CIKSAYDI DESEYDI 
BARIS ISTYIYORUZ BU GÜN HIC BIR ANNE AGLAMIYACAKTI........ ???? 
15“tanrı cumlesı neden sizi rahatsiz ediyo arkadaslar sizler alah dediyinizde kimse alah 
demeyin diye baskı yapiyormu sizlere. herkes sizin gıbı dusunmek zurunda deyil.???” 
(Galatasaray, September 6) 
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16“tanrı cumlesı neden sizi rahatsiz ediyo arkadaslar sizler alah dediyinizde kimse alah 
demeyin diye baskı yapiyormu sizlere. herkes sizin gıbı dusunmek zurunda deyil.???” 
(Galatasaray, September 6) 
17mhp mhp takmışsınız mhp ye akp nizide gördük şehit üstüne şehit aslını gerçeğini 
bilmeden asmadınız kesmediniz ülkedeki tüm kamuları polisi tsk yı ele geçirdiniz 
sultansınız ya buyrun apo elinizde asın 
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